On November 13, 2025, I accompanied Elvis in an online presentation for students of the Master in International Relations at the Catholic University of Leuven, who had requested him as part of their course: « European Union, International Cooperation and Development ».  This intervention focused on the following theme: « What links between the European Green Deal and development policies? What “negative externalities” in the use of raw materials beyond European borders?”.

To make my accompaniment to Elvis useful, I gave my point of view in relation to: “The Observation on Zambia, the comparison with the Democratic Republic of Congo, and issues of green colonialism.”

I give you a summary of them below:

The European Green Deal is the best known project, launched by the European Commission in 2019. In 2026, it is still the European Union’s major roadmap with the following objectives (European Commission: the European Green Deal):

  • Carbon neutrality by 2050: Making Europe the first climate-neutral continent.
  • Target 2030: Reduce net greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55% compared to 1990 (via the Fit for 55 legislative package).
  • Circular economy: Transforming production to reduce resource use and waste.
  • Social justice: Ensuring a “just transition” to leave no one behind, especially the regions and workers most affected by the end of fossil fuels.

To come back to our subject: what about the comment on Zambia?

Challenges and paradoxes of the mining industry in Zambia

Zambia is strategically positioned in the global energy transition thanks to its large reserves of critical raw materials (copper, cobalt, etc). While this position offers unprecedented economic opportunities, it also raises major structural challenges.

Strengths and opportunities

The country is characterized first and foremost by political stability facilitating international partnerships, particularly with the European Union. Recent agreements aim to integrate Zambia into global value chains through the development of local skills. In addition, major projects such as the Lobito corridor promise to open up the region and boost intra-African trade.

Limits and risks

However, there are flaws in this model. Zambia is struggling to move beyond the export of raw materials, with local processing still in its infancy. Socially and environmentally, mining generates critical pollution and land conflicts that threaten food security. Finally, the new infrastructure risks becoming mere « extractive corridors » for rapid export, with no real benefits for local populations.

What about the comparison with the Democratic Republic of the Congo?

Comparative mining dynamics (Zambia and DRC)

Zambia and the DRC share a destiny linked to their geological riches, essential to the global energy transition. Their situation presents striking similarities but also contrasts of governance.

Points of convergence

Both nations are under intense international pressure for access to copper and cobalt. They face the same negative externalities: marginalization of populations, environmental degradation and land conflicts. Moreover, their agreements with the European Union, while strategic, limit their fiscal sovereignty and their ability to industrialize production locally.

Context discrepancies

The key difference is stability: whereas Zambia enjoys a peaceful environment and historic state regulation, the DRC is marked by the militarization of mining areas and institutional fragility that complicates the protection of human rights.

Finally, issues of green colonialism in Zambia:

Zambia facing the challenge of green colonialism

The concept of « green colonialism » refers to a global energy transition that, under the guise of ecology, reproduces the relationships of North-South domination. In Zambia, the application of the term has led to a debate between the persistence of extractivism and the emergence of new sovereignty.

Indicators of a colonial drift

Several factors support this thesis. Agreements with the European Union, often asymmetric, impose intense production pressure without binding financing obligations. The economic structure remains colonial: Zambia exports its raw resources to global technology hubs, capturing a tiny share of the value added. Moreover, infrastructure like the Lobito corridor prioritizes rapid export over local development, often threatening ecologically fragile areas.

Conclusion

The analysis of the mining situation in Zambia, put into perspective with the DRC model, reveals a pivotal moment for southern Africa. While the global energy transition offers a historic opportunity for development thanks to the growing demand for critical metals, it carries the risk of « green colonialism ».

On the one hand, international partnerships and infrastructure such as the Lobito corridor open up avenues for regional integration and economic stability. On the other hand, the persistence of an extractivist model, where value added eludes local populations in favor of the powers of the North and China, threatens to reproduce historical inequalities.

Ultimately, Zambia’s ability to turn this potential into a real lever for development will depend on its ability to impose local industrialization and protect its communities. To avoid the trap of an ecological transition to the detriment of the South, the country must transform its strategic agreements into tools of real economic sovereignty.

Berlaine K. ICM